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Article 9

INDIANA DOCKET
24729 BERRY V. STATE.
ruary 12, 1929.

Delaware County.

Affirmed. Willoughby, J. Feb-

Appellant is convicted on the charge of conspiring to commit a felony
of unlawfully possessing and controlling a still and distilling apparatus for
the manufacture of intoxicating liquor. See opinion for full discussion of
the objections: (1) That the facts stated in said affidavit do not constitute
a public offense, and (2) That the affidavit does not state the offense
charged therein with sufficient certainty. It was not error to admit as evidence statements made by a defendant co-conspirator when such statements were offered after the establishing of a prima facie case of conspiracy, although such statements were not made in the presence of the defendant.
24772 DAMRON V. STATE. Warrick County. Affirmed. Willoughby, J.
February 14, 1929.
Defendant was convicted on a charge of conspiring to commit a felony;
the specifications of error are the refusing and giving of certain instructions, and that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law. There was no
error in the matter of instructions and the verdict of the jury was sustained by sufficient evidence and not contrary to law.
24534 DAvis v. STATE. Jay County. Reversed. Willoughby, J. February 13, 1929.
This was an appeal from a conviction on an affidavit charging larceny.
On authority of Landess v. State, 164 N. E. 264, the judgment of the trial
court is reversed.
25349 MOSLEY V. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF MARION,
ET AL. Marion County. Affirmed. Gemmill, J. February 19, 1929.
This is an action testing the constitutionality of Ch. 194, Acts 1925, pp.
457-463, authorizing municipal courts in incorporated cities containing a
population of not less than 300,000, according to the last preceding census
of the United States. The Act in question is not invalid by reason of the
provision which authorizes the judges of the municipal court to be appointed by the governor nor is it open to objection upon the ground that it
is local and special. There was no error in sustaining the demurrers to
the amended complaint.
25350 MOSELY ET AL, AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF CENTER TOWNSHIP, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA V. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COUNTY OF MARION, ET AL. Marion County. Affirmed. Gemmill, J.
February 19, 1929.
This action involves the validity of an act of the 1925 General Assembly
(Ci. 117, p. 293, Acts of 1925), reducing the number of justices of the
peace to one in townships of the state located in whole or in part within
the corporate limits of any city wherein municipal courts exist; such municipal courts being provided for by Ch. 194, Acts 1925, pp. 457-463, for
cities containing a population of not less than 300,000. While Article 7,
422
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sec. 14 of the State Constitution provides that "a competent number of
justices of the peace shall be elected by the voters in each township in the
several counties," it leaves the number to legislative determination; and any
regulation formerly made by the Board of Commissioners that provided for
more than one justice of the peace in the township in question was in conflict with Chapter 117, Acts 1925 and could not govern after the term of
appellant had expired.
24826 R THCHILD V. STATE.

Marion County.

Reversed.

Myers, J.

Feb-

ruary 13, 1929.
Appellant was indicted and convicted in the court below of perjury.
The defendant in an affidavit before a notary public had stated that he was
the owner of the property consisting of stocks and fixtures and that there
were "no liens or equitable mortgages, liens, rights or claims of any kind
outstanding against any of said property. This affidavit is made for the
to purchase said goods." At the
purpose of inducing
time of the making of the affidavit there was an outstanding judgment
against the defendant. The court says that prior to the consumation of
a bulk sale, as here, the judgment creditor, in the absence of an execution
in the hands of an officer or other non-lien holding creditor, has no lien,
right or claim by virtue of our Bulk Sales Law against the personal
property of the seller; and consequently the affidavit made by the defendant
did not constitute the offense of perjury within sec. 2577 Burns 1926.
25335 STATE Ex REL. BAKER V. ORANGE, ET AL.

Vanderburg County.

Re-

versed. Martin, C. J. February 15, 1929.
This case involves the interpretation of the term "municipal courts" as
used in Sec. 1, Ch. 117, Acts 1925, sec. 1858 Burns 1926, in relation to the
question of the law of justices of the peace in certain counties. The court
says that considering the foregoing section along with two other laws which
were enacted at the same session of the General Assembly, and which concerned courts which are denominated "municipal courts," the reasonable
conclusion is that the term "municipal court" in Sec. 1858 Burns 1926
means the same that it does in the other two laws, viz.: "the name of a
certain county court of inferior jurisdiction in counties which contain a city
of not less than 300,000 inhabitants."
24507 Wiso Im'ER V. STATE. Marion County. Reversed. Travis, J.
February 19, 1929.
Appellant was charged in different counts of various violations of the
law concerning intoxicating liquor. There was a motion to quash the affidavit for the reason that it was not approved by the prosecuting attorney
as required by law; also exceptions to the order to confiscate and sell the
automobile. Because of such omission of the prosecuting attorney's approval the affidavit was insufficient to lawfully present the crime, and the
overruling of the motion to quash was error since there was not a lawful
"conviction". The order of the court confiscating and selling the automobile was invalid. The court distinguishes from Parish v. State (1923)
1924 Ind. 44; 141 N. E. 786, as respects the requirement of endorsement by
the prosecuting attorney, pointing out that in that case the crime was a
misdemeanor of which the city court had jurisdiction to try and fully
determine.
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APPELLATE COURT
13166 (cases 13166 to 13173 inclusive, consolidated under this number.)
ABDEN v. WALLACE, Er AL. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February 18, 1929.
Action by appellant against appellees to obtain injunctive relief compelling appellees and those whom they represent to recognize appellant as
a member of the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
and one of its subordinate local divisions, and prohibiting appellees and
those whom they represent from interfering with appellants' rights, etc.
"The judgment is reversed with instructions to the court to restate its
conclusions of law in harmony with this opinion and to render judgment
accordingly." See opinion for full discussion of the findings and conclusions of law based thereon.
13167 ABDEN V. WALLACE, ET AL.

Marion County.

Reversed.

Nichols, J.

February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13169 ALLEY V. WALLACE, Lr AL.

Marion County.

Reversed. Nichols, J.

February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13370 ATLAS SECURITIES Co. v. FERREL. Boone County. Affirmed.
Nichols, J. February 1, 1929.
Action by appellees for the cancellation of a certain note and mortgage
securing the same on the ground that the note and mortgage were executed
for an illegal and invalid consideration and under duress. The appellant
complains that the special finding contains evidentiary facts and that there
are conclusions of law in such findings. The court says that eliminating
in the findings the evidential facts of which appellant complains, and the
conclusions which it contends are of law and not of facts, the findings are
still sufficient upon which to base conclusions of laws.
13130 TE

BALTIMORE & OHIO SOUTHERN RD. Co. v. BEACH.

Jennings

County. Reversed. Nichols, C. J., McMahan, P. J. and Remy, J.
dissent. February 23, 1929.
Appellee seeks to recover from the appellant, his employer, under the
provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, for an injury alleged to
have been due to the negligent operation of a motor car by a fellowemployee, the negligence consisting of operating the car at a dangerous and
excessive rate of speed. The opinion states that "by continuing in the
employee of the appellant, and riding on the motor car during the several
years that he was in such employment, when he knew that it was being
operated at an excessive and dangerous speed, and in violation of the rules
of appellant, assumed the risk of such dangerous operation."
13159 BLASENGYM v. GENERAL ACCIDENT, Fin & LiFE AssuRANCE CoRP,

LTD. Marion County. Reversed. Enloe, C. J. February 20, 1929.
This is an action to recover for damages to an automobile received in a
collision at the intersection of two streets. By the act creating the municipal courts (Acts 1925, sec. 25, sec. 1748 Burns 1926) a judge pro tempore
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before whom the case was tried, has authority to file the bill of exceptions
after the term for which he had been appointed has expired. Sec. 1054
Burns 1926 should not be given the construction that the right of the one
reaching the intersection of the streets or highways first is an absolute
right. Both drivers should exercise reasonable care to avoid coming into
a collision and "even though the street or highway upon which he is traveling be a 'preferential' one, it is still his duty to use reasonable care to avoid
coming into collision -with another machine, though the quantum of care
may vary with the surrounding circumstances."
13353 CITY OF BLOOMINGTON V. LUZADDEM
Per Curiam. February 19, 1929.
Per Curiam Affirmed with 10% penalty.

Monroe County. Affirmed.

13235 BOARD OF COMIISSIONERS OF TIPPECANOE COUNTY, INDIANA V. DAVIS.

Tippecanoe County. Affirmed Nichols, J. February 23, 1929.
The chief question in this case is whether appellee is entitled, as assessor
of Fairfield township, Tippecanoe County, to a salary of $3000 per annum
under Sec. 14176 Burns 1926. The court says that appellee's claim is a
valid one and that he pursued the proper remedy by filing his claim with
the Board of County Commissioners and after failing to secure its allowance, by appealing to the circuit court. Appellee's claim is not rendered
invalid by reason of the fact that no appropriation of money with which
to pay the same has been made, since his claim does not grow out of a
contract made in violation of the law.
13279 BURTON, ET AL. V. RYAN, ET Al.

Orange County.

Affirmed.

Mc-

Mahan, P. J. February 13, 1929.
This is an action to obtain possession of certain personal property.
There was no error in refusing a change of judge under the facts in the
case, nor in refusing to try the case before the jury. The evidence was
sufficient to support the findings as to ownership of the property.
COUNTY. Affirmed. McMahan, P. J.
February 13, 1929.
From a decree declaring a deed a mortgage, the defendants appeal. Tle
trial court did not err in finding that the deed and contract executed concurrently constituted a mortgage, and not a conveyance subject to a conditional right on the part of the grantor to buy the land back.
13279 BURTON, ET AL. V. ORANGE

13374 CANAN V. CANAN. Floyd County. Reversed. McMahan, P. J.
February 20, 1929.
This was an action for divorce and it is contended that the decision of
the lbwer court was contrary to law inasmuch as the court was without
jurisdiction, for the reason that the affidavit of the residence of appellee
filed with his complaint as required by sec. 1097 Burns 1926 did not confer
jurisdiction on the court. The statute was not substantially complied with.
13180 CAPITOL AIUSEMENT CO., ET AL. V. WASHINGTON & NEW JERSEDY

REALTY Co. Marion County. Affirmed. Remy, J. February 1, 1929.
Suit in a municipal court by appellee as landlord against his tenant and
a co-defendant who had guaranteed that the tenant would carry out the
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terms of his lease, judgment being rendered against each of them for possession of real estate and damages in the sum of $1000. The court concludes that the municipal court has unlimited jurisdiction as to damages
recoverable in an action for possession and the recovery of damages; but
as against the defendant guarantor, the statute which limits jurisdiction
in actions founded on contract applies and his demurrer should have been
sustained.
13217 DETROIT FIDELITY & SURETY CO. v. RICKEY, ET AL.

Marion County.
Affirmed. Remy, J. February 23, 1929.
This was an action on a surety bond for the value of materials and
labor furnished to the contractor-principal. The bond in question was
given by the contractor to induce the obligee to pay the balance to become
due upon the completion of a certain building, in accordance with the
terms of an existing contract. The conditions of the bond obligation were
that the principal should faithfully perform the contract on his part, and
satisfy all claims, etc. There was sufficient consideration for the bond in
that the contractor received payment without having to comply with certain provisions under the driginal building contract. The surety company
was not released by reason of alterations in the original contract as the
alterations were made in accordance with the terms of the contract. The
court says that any doubt about the bond's covering the modified contract
is taken care of by the rule that bond executed by a surety for property will
be construed most favorably to the person secured, if the bond is open to
two constructions.
13352 FLEMING V. BISHOP. Elkhart County. Reversed. Lockyear, J.,
Enloe, P. J. dissents. February 15, 1929.
This action was upon a broker's contract for commissions for selling
real estate and the chief question was whether the memorandum contained
sufficient descriptions of the real estate to comply with Sec. 8048 Burns
1926. The court concludes that the reference to the real estate is sufficient
to identify the same and says: "We believe that any man of ordinary
intelligence, given the above description, could go out and find the farm."
13198 GEIGER V. UHL, ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. Remy, J. February 13, 1929.
This case involves chiefly the adjusting of boundaries of lots in a platted
addition, when the actual measurement of the platted addition, compared
with the boundaries shown by the plat, reveals a deficiency of frontage.
The court rejects the "remnant rule" and adopts the "apportionment rule"
which requires that the deficiency or surplus be apportioned among the
owners of all lots in the block or subdivision containing the deficiency or
surplus.

13544 HERBERT V. NATIONAL CITY BANK, ExEcuToR, ET AL. Vanderburgh
County. Reversed. Remy, J. February 20, 1929.
This is an action by a widow to contest the will of her husband. One
question presented is: Can appellant, who as widow had made her election
under the law, maintain an action to contest the will? The court says
that the appellant has a subsisting property interest in the estate affected by
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the will and therefore sufficient interest to maintain this action; and that
by her action in electing to take against the will, she did not recognize the
instrument in question as a valid will, and would not thereby estop herself
to contest the validity of the instrument.
13396 HIXON v. NImA.

Marion County. Affirmed.

Lockyear, J.

Feb-

ruary 20, 1929.
This is an action by the father of a minor son to recover for personal
injuries received by the minor, consolidated with an action by the father
against the same defendant for loss of services, etc. The error filed was
the overruling of a demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer and
the court says the second paragraph of the answer is only an argumentative denial of the material facts of the complaint and therefore it was not
error to overrule the demurrer to it.
13397 HIXON V. NIMAN. Marion County. Affirmed. Lockyear, J. February 20, 1929.
Affirmed on authority of Hcon v. Ni an, being No. 13396 decided this
term.
13316 ESTATE OF MARY EMALINE HOLEm V. HAMPTON.
Affirmed. Per Curiam. February 19, 1929.
Per Curiam. Affirmed with 10% penalty.

Marshall County.

13029 INDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY CO. V. SHOUP. Hancock County.
Reversed. Nichols, J., McMahan, P. J. dissents. February 18, 1929.
Action to recover for death of minor son who was struck by a racing
car while viewing race from outside the inclosure surrounding race track of
appellant. Opinion distinguishes the facts from "attractive nuisance cases"
and says that "the charge against appellant is want of the exercise of due
care, or negligence, and appellee's son, being at most, a mere licensee, appellant owed him no legal duty in this regard.
13274 IROQUOIS AUTO INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, r AL. v. STOCKER. Vanderburg County. Affirmed. McMahan, P. J. February 14, 1929.
The case involves the power of an agent to bind the appellant-insurance
company for repairs to automobiles, the appellant claiming that a part of
appellee's claim was for work done on automobiles which were not within
the coverage of its policies and that the alleged agent had no authority to
have the automobiles repaired on the credit of the appellants. The trial
court was justified in finding that the agent was acting within the apparent scope of his authority when he sent-the automobiles to appellee to be
repaired. See case for the facts.
13264 LEwIS, ADMR. v. SHEARS, ET AL. St. Joseph County. Reversed.
Neal, J. February 23, 1929.
Reversed on the authority of Feldman v. Elmore, 163 N. E. 846.
13139 LORBER V. PEOPLES MOTOR COACH CO., ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. Neal, J., Nichols, J. concurs in result. February 1, 1929.
This was an action to recover from two defendants, on the theory of
concurrent negligence, for injuries received in an automobile collision. The
trial court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant bus
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company. Since the motion for an instructed verdict is equivalent to a
demurrer to the evidence, "the court is bound to accept as true all the facts
which the evidence tends to prove, and, as against the party demurring,
to draw from the evidence such reasonable inference as the jury might
draw and also to resolve all conflicts in the evidence favorable to the parties against whom the demurrer is directed." Consequently it was error to
sustain the motion for directed verdict since there was evidence from which
it might have been inferred that the bus was not operated in a careful
manner.
13170 MARTIN v. WALLACE, ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13561 MATHENA v. LosEy. Johnson County. Reversed. McMahan, P. J.
February 21, 1929.
This case involves a claim for salary as deputy sheriff under the appointment claimed to have been made by the sheriff pursuant to Sec. 11620
Burns 1926. The trial court found the facts specially and concluded as a
matter of law that appellee was entitled to recover a certain sum. The
decision of the trial court is not sustained by the evidence and the court
erred in excluding certain evidence as to the amount of salary paid by the
sheriff to appellee.
13169 McGNNIs v. WALLACe, ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols,
J. February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13205 MINAS FuRNrrURE; Co. v. EDWARD C. MINAS CO. Porter County.
Affirmed. Nichols, J. February 23, 1929.
This was an action by appellee to enjoin appellant from the use of the
word "Minas" in its corporation name, and from alleged unfair trade competition and for damages for alleged invasion of its rights, appellee claiming a prior right to the use of the name "Minas". See opinion for the facts
and full discussion.
13278 CITY OF MUNCIE V. SHARP. Delaware County. Reversed, McMahan, P. J. February 15, 1929.
This was a suit by appellee to recover from the appellant city for damages to property which damage was alleged to have been caused by the
appellant's "purposely, wilfully and wrongfully" failing to remove certain
pipes from which water was being discharged upon appellee's property.
"The complaint being based upon the theory that appellee was the legal
owner of the property, and the cause having been tried upon that theory,
it will be disposed of in this court on the same theory. The undisputed
evidence being that appellee was not the owner when this action was commenced, we hold the verdict is not sustained by the evidence."
13284 ROCHFORD, ADMR., V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. Co. Marion County.
Reversed. Nichols, J. February 1, 1929.
Where defendant died outside the state of Indiana, leaving no property
except two life insurance policies located in Marion county, Indiana, these
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policies constitute assets within the meaning of Sec. 3066 Burns 1926 which
provides among other things that letters of administration of an estate may
be granted where the defendant, not being an inhabitant, and dying out of
the state, leaves assets.
13171 ROTHER V.WALLACE, ET AL. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13172 RYAN V. WALLACE, Er AL. Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).
13365 SHEPHERD V. BANNISTER, ET AL.

Marion County. Affirmed

Per

Curiam. February 15, 1929.
Per Curian.
13314 STOLL, ET AL. v. RICH, ET AL. St. Joseph County. Reversed. Nichols,

J. February 23, 1929.
This is an action by attorneys for executors of an estate to recover their
fees as attorneys. The claim was filed in the St. Joseph circuit court and
the judge thereof on his motion transferred the same, without any objection,
to the St. Joseph superior court No. 3. The appellants having appeared
and filed their motion to make the complaint more specific, and then having
secured a change of judge on which the cause was transferred to superior
court No. 2 and the case having gone to trial, the appellants waived their
right to object to the superior court's jurisdiction of the particular case,
the court having general jurisdiction over such matter under Sec. 1608
Burns 1926. It was error to refuse to permit cross-examination of attorneys as expert witnesses, as to the value of the respective services performed.
13468 STOLL v. BOLiN.
23, 1929.
Per Curiam.

Lake County.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

February

Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February 15, 1929.
Reversed on authority of Abden v. Wallace, et al. (decided this term).

13173 TAYLOR V. WALLACE, Er AL.

13307 UNION DRAWN

STEEL Co. v. THOMPSON.

Industrial Board.

Af-

firmed. Enloe, C. J. February 25, 1929.
As a result of an injury received June 12, 1926, the appellee, under a
compensation agreement approved by the Industrial Board, received five
and two-sevenths weeks compensation for a "temporary total disability."
On December 9, 1927, appellee filed an application for an award on account
of a change of condition. Where an injury results in an immediate temporary disability, and also in an immediate permanent partial impairm'ent
there will be two independent claims, one for the temporary total disability
and one for the partial impairment, and these claims, as to the time of their
filing with the Industrial Board, are covered by Sec. 24 of our Compensation
Act and not by Sec. 45 which controls as to time for filing applications for
awards based upon "change of condition." Therefore the application for

430
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an award of compensation as for permanent partial impairment filed December 9, 1927, was within the time given by Sec. 24.
13203 WEIDNER V. CITY OF RICHMOND. Henry County. Affirmed. Nichols,
J., Neal, J. concurs in result. February 15, 1929.
This was an action to recover a sum of money which the plaintiff
alleged consisted of interest on "Barrett Law" funds, which interest the
plaintiff had received while county treasurer and ex-officio treasurer of the
defendant city of Richmond and while having said "Barret Law" funds in
his custody; the plaintiff alleging that he had paid over the money "under
protest, over his objection and against his will." While indicating that
Barret Law funds are public funds and therefore subject to the provisions
of the depository acts, the court does not determine this question; but says
that the act of loaning the fund was an illegal act under Sec. 2467 Burns
1926 and consequently the present action of the appellant is in effect an
action based on his own illegal act. Consequently the law will not help
him, but will leave him where it finds him.

